In equilibrium, greater acceptability raises the extent of market activity, the value of money, and ex-ante welfare (goods are indivisible, so prices are unaffected).
A normative implication of these results is that the key to improve the decentralized monetary allocation is to maximize the value of a currency (fostering low prices) because this also implies minimum consumption risk (maximum market activity). Thus, it is natural to ask whether such a positive link between money's value, market activity, and welfare is a general feature of this class of models.
Our study suggests that this is not the case. The intuition is that a trade-off may exist between consumption risk and prices. Although expanded market activity has beneficial extensive margin effects, it lowers consumption risk, it may also have negative intensive margin effects, and it may lower trading efficiency. For example, prices may substantially rise and trade surplus may fall if greater market activity amounts to adding a small number of very inefficient producers to the seller's pool.
To provide this intuition we consider a model similar to Johri's, where agents are subject to productivity shocks and choose market trading or home production, at each date. We study stationary allocations where traded quantities are bilaterally bargained. In equilibrium, money's value, prices, and market activity are endogenous. Two equilibria may exist, with high or low participation. When agents are patient, money has lots of value so buyers tend to spend it only when they find an efficient producer, who has a low marginal cost. The opposite tends to occur when agents are impatient. Existence also hinges on the available money stock and the distribution of shocks, as they also affect the value of money.
We find equilibrium multiplicity for moderate money supplies and discount factors. Here, money's value (hence, traded quantities) is negatively correlated with market activity and may also be negatively correlated with welfare. In fact, we provide examples where ex-ante welfare is higher when market activity is the lowest and the value of money is highest. The reverse, ex-ante welfare is higher when market activity is the highest, but the value of money is lowest, can also occur if agents are more patient. What is the reason?
Low market activity happens when buyers trade only with efficient sellers, who produce a lot for a dollar. Inefficient sellers stay out of the market, which raises consumption risk. These two elements tend to boost the equilibrium value of money. Whether this improves trading efficiency or not depends on just how much prices fall. Since prices fall substantially when agents are more patient and money is more scarce, moderate money stocks and moderate discount factors tend to sustain greater trading efficiency, under low market activity. In addition, if most sellers are efficient, consumption risk grows only slightly, under low market activity. Hence, low market activity may be socially preferred to higher activity. This result tends to be reversed when agents are more patient-since money's value tends to be inefficiently high-and when the seller's pool is mostly inefficient-since greater participation lowers trading risk substantially.
ENVIRONMENT
The environment is a version of Shi (1995) and Trejos and Wright (1995) . Time is discrete and infinite, t ϭ 0, 1, 2, .... There is a constant unit mass of people, a divisible and perishable market good, and a homemade good.
At the beginning of each t agents choose market trading or home production. In the latter case, the agent costlessly produces the homemade good, enjoying ε Ͼ 0 consumption utility. In the former case, the agent trades on the market as a seller or a buyer, depending on whether he has money or if he can produce market goods. Sellers and buyers are randomly matched. A fraction M ʦ (0, 1) of agents is endowed with one unit of indivisible fiat money in t ϭ 0, while the others can produce market goods once. Everyone can produce market goods contingent on prior market consumption.
1 However, everyone wishes to consume only the market production of someone else; in that case, q Ͼ 0 consumption generates utility u(q) ϭ (q α րα), α ʦ (0, 1). The period discount factor is δ ʦ (0, 1).
We introduce heterogeneity by means of random variable costs of production. At the end of each t, an agent draws a productivity shock (i.i.d. across time and agents). In the next period, he can produce q market goods (1) inefficiently with probability λ ʦ (0, 1), generating disutility θq, or (2) efficiently with probability 1Ϫλ, generating disutility q Ͻ θq. This is unlike Johri (1999) , who considers random fixed costs of production.
SYMMETRIC STATIONARY EQUILIBRIA
We study equilibria where agents adopt identical, time-invariant strategies focusing on pure strategies (it is sufficient to make our point).
At the beginning of each t, an agent can be one of three "types" k. He is a "buyer" if he has money, k ϭ m, or he is an "efficient" or "inefficient seller", k ϭ H or k ϭ L, depending on the shock realization. Afterward, the agent chooses market trading or home production. Let p k be the fraction of traders of type k present in the market on some date t, so that p m ϩ p H ϩ p L ϭ 1.
On the market, buyer-seller pairs are randomly formed with the matching rate proportional to the fraction of possible partners. That is, a buyer meets a seller with probability p H ϩ p L and a seller meets a buyer with probability p m . This implies that although some traders may remain unmatched, every match is single coincidence. Since credit or barter are impossible, agents must exchange money for goods. In a match, the seller's type is observed. Let q H and q L be the goods traded for money 1. Thus, as in the original search model of money, a buyer always spends his entire cash holdings. This simplifies the distribution of money. Of course, initial money holders must be able to trade with those who do not initially have money. A way to achieve this is to assume that the latter agents have a production opportunity and these opportunities can be acquired again only by consuming (as in Shi, 1995 , where goods are divisible or Camera, 2000 , where goods are indivisible).
by an efficient and inefficient seller, respectively, in equilibrium. Also, let c i (q i ) ϭ θ i q i , where θ H ϭ 1 and θ L ϭ θ.
Prices
as the beginning-of-period lifetime utility of a type k agent (we omit the arguments when understood). Therefore, for convenience we let
denote the net continuation value of someone who sells today. This is the discounted value of holding money at the beginning of next period, δV m , minus the discounted expected value of being a seller, δ[(1Ϫλ)V H ϩ λV L ]. Clearly, the buyer's continuation value from buying is ϪF(q L , q H ).
In a match with seller i ϭ H, L, traders determine the amount Q i to be exchanged for a unit of money, given (q L , q H ). We assume Q i is determined according to the Nash bargaining solution, when traders have equal bargaining power and the threat points are their respective lifetime utilities. The match's surplus is u(
The seller trades only if his continuation value is larger than his production disutility,
If an unconstrained solution exists, it must be such that u(
where
Omitting the arguments q L and q H , note that
equilibrium exists where prices satisfy Equation (2), then it must be that q L Ͻ q H Ͻ θq L . This is intuitive. Given any quantity Q, inefficient sellers earn less surplus than efficient sellers. Since seller's bargaining power is type-independent, it follows that in equilibrium the efficient sellers must offer the best prices, i.e., the largest quantities.
Strategies and Value Functions
Given q L Ͻ q H Ͻ θq L , if buyers prefer to trade with inefficient sellers, they also trade with efficient sellers. Thus, let β′ L be the probability 0 or 1 that a buyer chooses to trade his money for q L (β L is the strategy of everyone else). In a symmetric monetary equilibrium, individual optimality and aggregate consistency require
Let π′ k denote the probability 0 or 1 that a type k agent chooses to trade on the market in a period (π k is the probability chosen by everyone else). The buyer's expected market payoff is
since with probability p H he trades with an efficient seller and with probability p L β L he trades with an inefficient seller. The surplus is u(
Individual optimality and aggregate consistency in equilibrium require
Of course, a monetary equilibrium requires π m ϭ 1. Since q H Ͼ q L , then in equilibrium, buyers must be willing to trade at least with an efficient seller. This
It also requires ε sufficiently small (more later).
For a seller of type i ϭ H, L, individual optimality and aggregate consistency require
and ε small are necessary or the seller would choose home production. The implication of Equations (4)- (6) is that in a monetary equilibrium the terms of trade must give positive surplus to both partners, since u(
There are two consequences. First, u(q i ) Ͼ c i (q i ) in every trade, so that q i ʦ (0,Q i ) , i.e., the Nash solution must be unconstrained.
2 Second, since the match's surplus u(q) Ϫ c i (q) is largest for i ϭ H, for any q, then if π m ϭ 1
the efficient sellers certainly participate in the market, i.e., π H ϭ 1. The key is whether inefficient sellers participate. Consequently, there are two types of monetary equilibria: one in which everyone participates in market trades, π m ϭ π H ϭ π L ϭ β L ϭ 1, and the other where there is limited participation, as inefficient sellers
Thus, in a monetary equilibrium, the value function must satisfy
Each right-hand side basically has two components: the expected payoff from market trade and the continuation payoff from not trading. This last component is δV m for a buyer and
Inefficient sellers can always guarantee themselves ε payoff, in equilibrium, by avoiding market participation, π L ϭ 0. This choice does not appear in the buyer and efficient seller's case because in a monetary equilibrium π m ϭ π H ϭ 1 is necessary.
The monetary equilibrium distribution of market traders must satisfy
To see why, note that a fraction M of the population has money, (1 Ϫ λ)(1 Ϫ M) are efficient sellers, and λ(1 Ϫ M) are inefficient sellers. Recall also that inefficient sellers may choose to avoid market trade, setting π L ϭ 0, in which case only money traders and efficient sellers are on the market. Thus, we must have π L λ(1 Ϫ M) in Equation (8). This implies that it is easier to meet an efficient seller when
An equilibrium is defined as follows:
that satisfies Equation (4) through Equation (8), where the price in a match is q Ϫ1 and satisfies Equation (1). Notice that Equations (4) and (6) imply that if in equilibrium buyers do not trade with inefficient sellers, β L ϭ 0, then these sellers prefer to stay out of the market, π L ϭ 0. Their behavior affects the decentralized allocation along an extensive and an intensive margin because it changes the buyers' matching probabilities and also the distribution of prices.
The extensive effect is negative. Since p m 8 π L ϭ0 Ͼ p m 8 π L ϭ1 , limited participation raises the matching probability of sellers, at the expense of buyers. Since it is harder to find a seller, buyers experience greater consumption risk. 4 The intensive effect can be positive. If π L ϭ 0 a buyer gets to trade only with an efficient seller who offers better prices, q H Ͼ q L . Since these effects move in opposite directions, there is potential for equilibrium multiplicity, discussed next.
EQUILIBRIA
Before proceeding with the analysis, we note that gains from trade are finite, since q i Ͻ Q i , and decrease in q i beyond some q i ʦ (0,Q i ), since u(q) Ϫ c i (q) is hump-shaped. As seen earlier, in a monetary equilibrium the terms of trade must give positive surplus to both partners. From Equations (5) and (6), we see that a monetary equilibrium exists only if ε is small enough. How small? It necessarily must be smaller than the gains from trade expected by buyers and (at least) efficient sellers. Since trade opportunities arise stochastically but vanish as M → 0,1 (see Equation 8), then M must be bounded away from zero and one, given any ε Ͼ 0.
5 Of course, as ε → 0, a monetary equilibrium can be sustained for any M ʦ (0, 1). Thus, to avoid unnecessary complications, in the remainder of the paper we simply focus on the case where ε → 0. Given this, we have: 
, and a degenerate price distribution associated to the unique quantity q** H .
Specifically, π m ϭ π H ϭ 1 and 
Consider an ε Ͼ 0 small and a q i ʦ (0,Q i ). In this case, the surpluses from trade and home production are positive. However, the expected gain from market trade is greater than the gain from home production for a buyer and an efficient seller only if Mʦ (_ M(ε) ,M (ε))ʚ(0,1). In this case, π m ϭ π H ϭ 1 is individually optimal and a monetary equilibrium can be sustained. 
There are several important findings. First, two monetary equilibria can exist that are distinguished by the extent of market activity, low or high. If every seller participates in market trade, we are in the high-participation equilibrium, otherwise we are in the low-participation equilibrium, where every seller is efficient. Second, each equilibrium type has a unique price distribution. Under high participation, there is price heterogeneity and the efficient sellers offer the lowest prices. The price distribution is degenerate under low participation. Third, these two equilibria coexist for some parameterization of the model. In this case, the high-participation equilibrium has the least consumption risk since trade frequencies are high. In short, trading is easier to accomplish than in the low-participation equilibrium. Now, recall that in this class of models the equilibrium value of money reflects its usefulness in facilitating spot transactions. Thus, the next finding is intuitive. Given coexistence for a certain money stock, money has the lowest value when market activity is high. It follows that prices are the highest-in every matchwhen the market is the most vibrant. The reason behind this last result is the existence of a pricing externality. If inefficient sellers enter the market, they do not produce much for a dollar. This lowers the equilibrium value of money. Consequently, efficient sellers also raise their prices above those they would otherwise charge. In short, full participation has a negative impact on traded quantities but has a positive impact on trading frequencies.
Characterization: The Role of Discounting and Money Stock
We characterize existence of monetary equilibrium based on discounting δ and initial money stock M, since these parameters have a direct influence on the value of money. 6 Precisely, money has lots of value when δ is large; in this case, sellers are willing to produce a lot in order to get money they can only spend in the future. It is also well known that in this class of models money has great value when it is scarce, i.e., M small, and has very little value when M is large. To explain our existence result, we use this intuition, and also a numerical illustration (Figure 1 , where ε ϭ 10 Ϫ8 , α ϭ 0.5, θ ϭ 3, λ ϭ 0.5). Trace a vertical line through the figure, and start at the bottom of it. When agents are very impatient, sellers do not produce much at all. Hence, if sellers' productivities are not extremely different, a buyer will prefer to spend his money as soon as he gets to meet any seller, even if the price is unattractive. Searching for a better price tomorrow is not a good idea because the buyer is impatient to consume. Thus, 6 . We focus on discounting and initial money stock for clarity. In the proof, we make it clear that existence depends on other parameters, besides δ and M. In particular, θ and λ affect the distribution of shocks and the buyer's reservation price. Clearly, if heterogeneity is extreme, say θ is very large, inefficient sellers charge high prices, so buyers would shun them (hence, π L ϭ 0 always). If heterogeneity is minimal, say, θ close to one or λ close to one, prices are so similar across sellers or there are so few efficient sellers, that buyers would likely buy from the first seller encountered (hence, π L ϭ 1 always). Technically, δ 1 and δ 0 tend to 1 when λ → 1 or θ → 1. every match leads to a trade and the market is very active, i.e., π L ϭ 1 is the unique equilibrium. This is independent of the money stock.
As we increase the discount factor above δ 0 (M)-and the stock of money is not out of hand-the value of money grows enough that buyers prefer to spend their money only in high-value matches, when prices are low. This, however, implies higher consumption risk; if buyers refuse high-price trades then the inefficient sellers prefer to stay out of the market, so that in equilibrium it is harder to buy. Thus, buyers face a trade-off; trade more frequently at higher prices or trade less frequently at lower prices. Since agents make independent and uncoordinated choices-and since buyers cannot spend fractions of their cash holdings-a strategic complementarity exists that generates equilibrium multiplicity, with high or low market activity (π L ϭ 0, 1). As discounting grows beyond δ 1 (M), the value of money is so large that spending it to buy just a fistful of goods is never a good idea, i.e., π L ϭ 0 is the unique equilibrium.
Why does the money stock matter? Due to random matching, buyers' willingness to pay a high price, rather than waiting to meet a more efficient (and cheaper) seller, depends on the matching frictions, governed by M. Money's value tends to zero as M → 1 because money crowds-out buying opportunities. Thus, the initial money stock cannot be too high, M Ͻ M 1 (δ), if π L ϭ 0 is an equilibrium. The opposite, M Ͼ M 0 (δ), must hold for π L ϭ 1 to be an equilibrium, since money has great value when M is small.
MARKET PARTICIPATION, THE VALUE OF MONEY, AND WELFARE
Since equilibrium multiplicity can arise, a natural question is which equilibrium is socially preferred. Thus, consider ex-ante welfare for π L ϭ 0, 1: 
The basic result, here, is that welfare in the high-participation equilibrium compares more or less favorably to the low-participation equilibrium, depending on the parameters. We provide the relevant intuition with the aid of numerical illustrations, without delving into the less informative mathematical derivations of a formal proof.
To start, pick any initial money stock that sustains equilibrium multiplicity. Now, note that welfare is maximized along two dimensions, trading frequency-or the extensive margin-and trading efficiency-or the intensive margin. We have proved that high participation generates the highest trading frequency, i.e., it has positive extensive margin effects. We have also proved that money tends to buy a lot in the low-participation equilibrium. This affects trade efficiency positively or negatively, depending on how low prices are. Money's indivisibility implies that overproduction can be as inefficient as underproduction. Hence, welfare comparisons hinge on possible trade-offs between intensive and extensive effects of market participation.
High participation is welfare inferior if it slightly improves trading frequencies, but raises prices so much that trades are inefficiently low. The opposite occurs if there are large extensive margin effects; substantially higher trading frequencies may well justify a moderate increase in prices. We provide an illustration via the numerical examples in Figures 2 and 3 . Figure 2 has the parameters of Figure 1 and δ ϭ 0.9. Multiplicities arise for M ʦ (0.221, 0.322) and the left panel shows that ex-ante welfare is uniformly higher under low participation.
The right panel explains why. The trade frequency is not much smaller, compared to high participation. However, average traded quantities are higher and less inefficient than under high participation. The figure reports average surpluses conditional on a match 
Clearly, average surplus is much higher under low participation, so there is a large positive intensive margin effect. Thus, the "best" equilibrium has the lowest prices-the highest value of money-but also the lowest market activity.
If we increase δ to 0.99 and λ to 0.95 we get Figure 3 . Multiplicities arise for M ʦ (0.248, 0.402). Since agents are more patient, production under low participation is larger but ex-ante welfare can be smaller for some M (left panel). For these money supplies, trades are most efficient under low participa-
, but trading frequencies are extremely low (right panel). The reason is that this economy has many inefficient sellers, so their absence from the market causes a severe increase in consumption risk. Thus, high participation creates large positive extensive margin effects: although trades are smaller, agents get to consume much more frequently. Thus, the best equilibrium has the highest prices-the lowest value of money-but the highest market activity.
ROBUSTNESS
In this section, we briefly discuss alternative price formation mechanisms. In particular, our main concern is whether equilibrium multiplicities would still arise when traders have different degrees of flexibility in making offers. This is an interesting exercise since we have demonstrated that different participation rates affect outcomes via their effect on trading frequencies and on the terms of trade. In particular, we have seen that low participation occurs because money is just too valuable so buyers avoid trading with inefficient sellers. For this reason, we consider two cases that can be thought of as belonging to the two opposite ends of an imaginary price-flexibility spectrum. First, we look at an economy without price formation at all; agents simply swap indivisible commodities for indivisible money. Then, we move on to the other extreme when goods and monetary offers are fully ex-ante flexible; we do so following Berentsen, Molico, and Wright (2002) , who allow for contracts with random components in the tradition of Prescott and Townsend (1984) .
We start by omitting the possibility of price formation. For instance, suppose sellers H and L produce indivisible goods of different sizes (large or small) or different observable qualities (good and mediocre) so that either way u(q L ) Ͻ u(q H ). In this environment, the buyer's surplus depends on the fixed quantity q i and the continuation value F(q L , q H ). When money is very valuable and q i is small, the buyer cannot bargain a better price; his only option is to go home hungry, hoping for better luck in the future. Consequently, our earlier intuition applies. We can have
In short, we still expect multiplicity. In fact, since prices cannot adjust at all, mixed trading strategies can also arise if u(q i ) ϭ F(q L , q H ). Thus, the model with fixed terms of trade should generate an even greater richness of monetary equilibria, characterized not only by different participation rates but also by different degrees of acceptability of money. Now move to the opposite end of the spectrum, when traders bargain not only on output but also on the probability of transferring money. This increases the flexibility in pricing as it convexifies the space of feasible ex-ante price offers as if money were divisible.
7 To see why, note that if money is really valuable-and the seller cannot produce much for a dollar-then the buyer can simply pay with small probability. In short, the buyer can lower his average expenditure in inefficient trades. Since the probability of spending the dollar can be arbitrarily small, a buyer will never pass onto a consumption opportunity, no matter how valuable is the dollar. In other words, the traders can always find a mutually beneficial agreement (in an ex-ante sense). This simple intuition suggests that with randomized monetary transfers we would still observe price heterogeneity but multiplicities due to market participation should disappear. In particular, participation should always be high in the limit as ε → 0. 7. This is not equivalent to having divisible money as demonstrated in Camera (2005) since agents are constrained to unit holdings. Even greater flexibility can be achieved when agents can hold multiple money units and use randomized trades (see Berentsen, Camera, and Waller 2004) . For a model with heterogeneity and lotteries see Lotz, Shevchenko, and Waller (2005) .
8. Of course we are modifying the model in two important ways. Since ex-post someone suffers a loss (the seller, if he gets no money and the buyer otherwise), we must assume commitment to a trade. We also assume that market production is independent of market consumption and impose a unit bound on money holdings. The reason is that the model in Section 1 does not admit stationary equilibria with randomized money transfers. Since market production is contingent on market consumption, producers who do not receive money are unable to consume (hence produce) market goods and exit the market. As more and more sellers do so, p m reaches an upper bound beyond which money has so little value that it is spent with probability 1 in every match.
In an unconstrained (τ i ≤ 1) symmetric equilibrium, the first-order conditions imply:
and q i ϭ (
Of course
e., money must be sufficiently valuable, otherwise it would be spent with certainty. Observe from Equation (9) that q i maximizes the match's surplus u(q i ) Ϫ c i (q i ), while τ i is chosen such that traders share the match's surplus equally, ex ante:
In short, greater flexibility in the buyer's spending strategy makes both traders better off ex ante, so it never makes sense to avoid a trade with an inefficient seller. The buyer can always limit his "capital loss" by spending the money infrequently, so that u(q i ) Ͼ τ i F(q L ,q H ). In addition, welfare will generally be higher than in the case without lotteries. The reason is that by using lotteries traders can maximize the match's surplus and can also increase the incidence of consumption by trading a little something even if the seller is inefficient.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have studied a search-theoretic model of money with heterogeneous sellers and endogenous market participation and shown that these features can lead to equilibrium multiplicity, with high or low market activity. Prices and market activity tend to be positively correlated, and the best equilibrium may be the one with low prices but also low economic activity. Money in this case facilitates trades that take place only with the most efficient sellers. However, we suspect that equilibrium multiplicities should vanish in models with degenerate distributions of divisible money. In that case, buyers would benefit by spending a little something-instead of their entire money holdings-even in matches with inefficient sellers.
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1 Let q i ϭ Q i ʦ (0,Q i ). Using Equation (7),
where 
( 1 1 ) A unique pair solves this equality and it is such that q * L Ͻ q * H (by continuity, these results hold for ε Ͼ 0 small).
We now prove optimality of the conjectured equilibrium strategies. From Equation Conjecture π m ϭ π H ϭ 1 Ͼ π L ϭ β L ϭ 0 is an equilibrium. Note F(q L ,q H ) ϭ F(q H ) Ͻ Q H and F′(q H ) Ͼ 0 for q H ʦ (0,Q H ). There is a unique q** H ʦ (0,Q H ) solving T H (q** H ) ϭ 0, since the first and second terms in T H (q H ) cross once.
To prove optimality of the strategies notice from Equation (6) that π L ϭ 0 if 
